Edward B. Titchener

Summary of On “Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It”

Joseph B. Watson’s idea of Behaviorism can be defined as a philosophy of psychology based on the proposition that all things that organisms do, including acting, thinking, and feeling can be regarded as behaviors. “Behaviorism comprises the position that all theories should have observational correlates but that there are no philosophical differences between publicly observable processes (such as actions) and privately observable processes (such as thinking and feeling).” (Fraley 2001)

Apparently Watson’s mentor, James Rowland Angell, was not happy with the fact that Watson had espoused the idea of Wundt’s experimental method being not scientific. Therefore Angell wrote to Titchener about the need to bring Watson down a few rungs on the ladder of his success. Titchener subsequently wrote this paper in reference to Watson’s behaviorist point of view. In this paper Titchener hammered home a vigorous case against Watson’s misuse of the word “science,” and how behaviorist theories, although beginning with science, ignore certain facts in order to maintain their positions. He goes on to point out the deficiency of only looking at the peripheral (physical actions) without examining the central (internal) effects of behavior. Watson leans heavily on blending sciences to form what Titchener calls “technology.” Titchener defines psychology as science and not a synthesis of many different sciences. He goes on to state that behaviorism is, by nature, biological. Titchener says,
“Either the behaviorist is just biologist; and in that case he has no nearer relation to psychology than have his coworkers who are content to call themselves biologists: or the behaviorist sees expression where the biologist sees ultimate fact; and in that case he may equally well be called psychobiologist, seeing that the phenomena expressed or reported by the organic changes which he studies cannot be anything else than psychical.” (Titchener, 1914)

Reaction to On “Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It”
If I were to toss my hat into this fray, I would have to side with Titchener. Behaviorism embraces the view that all theories should have observational correlates but that there are no philosophical differences between publicly observable actions and privately observable things such as thinking and feeling. So my conclusion might be the same as that of Titchener using his definition science. Restated in my terms, I believe that the problems of science are observational and analytical to the extent we can exhaust our knowledge and capabilities.
There are always going to be things just past the line we reach in any given field. New discoveries in science prove this every day. Where I would probably differ with Titchener would be in the last half of my definition stated above. I believe when we think we cannot know more than what can be observed through experimental science, and we see the limits of science to be an impassable line, we need to remember that in order to draw the impassable line we must first cross it. I believe it is only possible to cross the line when we have a full understanding of who God is, and who we are.
While I appreciate Titchener’s dogmatic view of science, I appreciate the fact that God tells us there is so much more than we could ever imagine.





Bibliography
Fraley, L. (2001). Stategic Interdisciplinary Relations between a Natural Science Community and a Psychological Community. The Behavior Analyst Today , 2 (4), 209-324.
Titchener, E. B. (1914). On "Psychology As The Behaviorist Views It". Retrieved 3 1, 2010, from Classics in the History of Psychology: http://psychclassics.asu.edu/Titchener/watson.htm




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